The Structure of Happiness

From the previous post, I tried to show how the meaning of happiness is distinct from the concept of satisfaction. It might be beneficial to get a little more formal with the terms that I am using. The word satisfaction shares the Latin root satis with the word satiation, which means sufficient. Here, the answer to the question for whom or for what is not entirely clear. Colloquially, satisfaction can be a sufficiency for any number of objects. We can construct an artificial distinction between two types of satisfied things; those that are under control and those that are not. For example, an itch is something for which scratching is sufficient, but the satisfaction is clearly not for an object under one's control. Of course, I can control it by scratching, but I cannot control whether or not I feel itchy. Therefore, when I scratch myself in an itchy spot, I am satisfying an urge or desire that it outside my control. (It is important to note that my distinction plays into a mind/body mythological duality. For common purposes, it might be more apt to simply state that scratching is my control over the itchy feeling. But the artificial distinction helps to characterize an important part I want to highlight about satisfaction.)

With the previous example, we can now see a difference between satisfaction with regard to the projects we set forth and those that are foisted upon us. An itch might be characterized as something forced upon us; we can only choose whether or not to satisfy it. A project we set out to accomplish, even though much of it might be inherited in a very important sense, does not fall under our simple framework vis-a-vis itching. Both the doing and the finishing of projects are thought of as involving one or another manner of satisfaction. Perhaps a project demands the consideration of an itch; its presence may demand that you see it to completion or vow to give it up. But often we find that projects can simply languish or fade away, either to be taken up later or forgotten altogether.

Here, we can see that what counts as satisfaction can depend upon the nature of the project. We can derive all of the relevant satisfaction from simply doing within the project. In fact, we could create a project whose purpose was to be satisfied while doing irrespective of an end point or culmination. In contrast, we may set ourselves a goal that brings satisfaction independent of the means. (This may be a contentious point. I am half-inclined to argue that such an entirely independent distinction may undercut its own framework of justification.) What we see is that the same word, satisfaction, can be used correctly to describe many different cases of sufficiency. The concept itself does not indicate the nature of the question to whom or to what. So, in asking the question, what should I do, navigating the potentially difficult paths of satisfaction could lead to interesting difficulties. I will outline two of them below.

First, however, I will try to show how the structure of happiness is importantly inherent in the structure of satisfaction that I outlined above. To me, the satisfaction in the doing itself is constitutive of happiness. Apart from that distinction, it must also be contained within a project that separates it from the types of simple satisfactions granted upon scratching an itch. Therefore, we have a goal or purpose as an important factor in its presence but as inessential in its content. Happiness becomes a way of doing or being in satisfaction that is importantly aware of itself through one or another goal.

The nature of happiness that I outlined above creates problems that both derive from and are illustrative of its structure. In the case of the project whose purpose is to derive a certain satisfaction in doing, the goal of the project is a reflection on the doing. Doing what? This goal is problematic and leads to what I will describe as the hedonistic variation of happiness. Without a proper starting point that informs and structures the doing, the prescribed acts themselves become a product of something like intuition. This may not be altogether bad if one believes that intuition is somehow informed or itself justified. But the problem with intuition is that it is plastic, perhaps by definition. (Wouldn't we have derived principles from mere intuition if they were, in fact, as fixed and definable as rules?) As the degree of happiness in such a reflexively-oriented purpose changes, it is impossible to tell what manner of change (in what direction?) might constitute a return to the happier doing by any metric that is not itself merely "intuitive". Therefore, the nature of the doing in such a structure could only define happiness in terms of what intuitively feels happy, which is clearly a system that tends toward the merely satisfying. On those terms, one could never know when she is passing from a fulfilling happiness to purely hedonistic revelry. In fact, being overly-sated is a direct result of such a reflexive structure.

Now, it is clear that happiness has a structure, although it is clearly not a thing or object. In aiming for it, I inadvertently aim to miss it. However, when I bring the focus of a goal upon the structure to provide a clarifying metric for happiness in doing, I encounter another problem. The structure of a project that would bring the distinct satisfaction of happiness keeps its goal as present but non-essential. The non-essentiallity of the goal leaves room for missing the happiness in choosing the goal. (My goal cannot be defined by its reference to making me happy, as that case is identical to the hedonistic variation of happiness.) It also leaves room for happily furthering some or other deplorable purpose. This dual-horned possibility in approaching the meaningful variation of happiness is the reason behind the present investigation.

I will investigate these two paths and how they are impacting me now in future posts.